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the grantor acquires and registers his title, to whom does it inure where both
grantees purchase for value in good faith? If the subsequently acquired title
passes as if conveyed by the original deed, it would vest in the holder of the elder
deed, and having vested, would not be affected by subsequent happenings.a An
obvious result would be that the registry laws would afford small protection to
the purchaser, who would have to search the records against each name in his
chain of title not only since the period when such grantee acquired title, but in-
definitely back of that period, in order to be sure that the grantor had not before
acquiring title given a deed which by estoppel transferred the subsequently ac-
quired title to an earlier grantee and thus deprive the purchaser without notice
of the title he relied on.
Our courts, in common with many others, hold that such an application of
the doctrine of estoppel is inconsistent with the registry laws, which were intended
to protect one who had secured a transfer of the title as registered. Consequently,
a purchaser is charged with notice only of transfers from the holder of the reg-
istered title, and need not search the records against his several grantors' names
prior to the dates at which they acquired title.6 4 Therefore, the holder of a re-
corded title has priority over the claimant by estoppel under a deed made before
the grantor acquired title.0 5
Deeds by the holders of future contingent interests, such as contingent re-
mainders and executory devises, as against the grantor and his heirs, convey such
contingent interests by estoppel, whether with or without warranty, where the
contingency is only as to the event and the person is determined.0 0
LIMITATIONS ON THE ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
DOCTRINE
LYMAN P. WILSON
PROFESSOR OF LAW, CORNELL UNIVERSITY
IN THE FIELD of tort elasticity and adaptability to changing conditions are
paramount. Nowhere else do we find fictions less excusable, formalism more
harmful, or mere mechanical logic more blinding. We must recognize the pressing
need of conscious progression toward "the adjustment of principles and doctrines
" Jarvis v. Aikens (1853) 25 Vt. 635, where the Court in answer to an argument based on the registry
laws said: "Our registry system can have no control of the question. There was no title in A. [the
grantor] when he deeded to At. [the second grantee]; it had before passed [by estoppel] to J. [the first
grantee]." See cases cited 2 Tiffany, Real Property, 2nd ed., 2131, note 55.
1 5
4
Door Co. v. Joyner (1921) 182 N. C. 518, 109 S. E. 259, 1 N. C. L. Rev. 56; Truitt v. Grandy(1894) 115 N. C. 54, 20 S. E. 293; Maddox v. Adrp (1894) 114 N. C. 585, 19 5. E. 665.
c' Door Co. v. Joyner, supra. Somewhat similar under our statutes is the position of a judgment
creditor under a docketed judgment and the holder of a prior unrecorded mortgage. Realty Co. v. Carter
(1915) 170 N. C. 5, 86 S. E. 714.
2 c See cases cited in notes 4 and 59 supra. See also Garvin v. Carroll (1916) 276 Ill. 476, 114 N. E.927.
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to the human conditions they are to govern rather than to assumed first principles;
for putting the human factor in the central place and relegating logic to its true
position as an instrument."' Within the past year a decision announced by the
Supreme Court of the United States2 has brought prominently into discussion a
question especially illustrative of this need. Much has already been said on this
subject but it is believed that the problem presented is worthy of continued con-
sideration.
In the Britt case3 two children, members of a motor touring party, met a
shocking death from poisonous water, swallowed while swimming in the defend-
ant's abandoned basement. It appears that this basement was one hundred feet
from the highway and could not be seen without entering the lot. Several paths
led across this lot, but none led to the pool. The lot was improperly fenced. The
water appeared clear, pure, and harmless, and no ordinary inspection, even by an
adult, would have revealed its highly dangerous nature. The doctrine of attractive
nuisance was urged as the basis of liability. The majority opinion,4 written by
Mr. Justice Holmes, held that this doctrine did not apply and set aside the judgment
for the plaintiff rendered by the lower court and reversed the finding of the Court
of Appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court.
The basis for this holding was, in outline: (a) infants have no greater right to
go upon the land of another than have adults; (b) the fact of the trespassers' in-
fancy places upon the landowner no greater duty to expect them, or to care for
their safety; (c) "temptation is not invitation;" (d) there was no showing that
children were in the habit of resorting to this place; (e) the pool could not be
seen from the highway, and was, therefore, not an invitation in fact; (f) a path
can not be an invitation to go to any place to which it does not lead; (g) the doc-
trine of allurement, if adopted, is so sweeping that it must be cautiously applied
in order that it shall not become unjust and create impracticable' requirements.
This opinion has been made the subject of somewhat severe criticism, 5 but it
is submitted that the charge of "mechanically deliminated categories" falls more
properly upon the dissenting argument. The opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes bears
such a resemblance to the North Carolina case of Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting
& Power Co.,6 that it seems worth while to consider the result of the Britt case
5 Roscoe Pound, in Mechanical Jurisprudece, 8 Col. Law Rev. 605, 609. For a most striking example
of this process in operation see the opinion of Judge Cardozo in Hynes v. New York Central (1921) 231
N. Y. 229, 131 N. E. 898, annotated in 35 Harv. L. Rev. 68, and 7 Cornell L. Quar. 75.
United Zinc and Chcmical Co. v. Briltt (U. S. 1922) 42 Suy. Ct. 299, annotated in 8 Cornell L.
Quar. 85, 36 Har. L. Rev. 113, 5 Ill. L. Rev. 62, and 32 Yale L. J. 200. Doctrine approved: New York,
N.H. & H. R. Co. v. Fruchter (U. S. 1922) 43 Sup. Ct. 38.
3Supra, note 2.
' The vigorous dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Clarke was concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Taft
and Mr. Justice Day.
"Under the Britt case, mechanically deliminated categories of trespassers, invitees and licensees are
erected from the fictions of implied license and implied invitation; those in the category of trespassers are
held to be owed no duty of care; the foreseeability of the child's presence through other causes than S
fictional license or invitation is immaterial. The substitution of rigidity for flexibility in the branch of
the law where flexibility to meet the varied circumstances of human experience is a prime requisite, seems
a retrogression in the humanization of the law of torts." 36 Harv. L. Rev. 113.
(1908) 148 N. C. 396, 62 S. E. 600, 19 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1116. The facts in this case are in certain
respects parallel to the Briltt case, in that the boy was not allured upon the premises by the agency which
caused his injury and there was in fact no notice of his actual or probable presence. The Briscoe case
has been approved in Power v. Casualty Co. (1910) 153 N. C. 275, 69 S. E. 234; Ferrell v. Cotton Mills
(1911) 157 N. C. 528, 73 S. E. 142; Barnett v. Mills (1914) 167 N. C. 576 83 S. E. 826; Starling v.
Cotton Mills (1915) 168 N. C. 229, 84 S. E. 388; Krachanake v. Mfg. Co. (191g) 175 N. C. 435, 95 S. E.
851; Hardy v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 266 Fed. 860. See also 47 L. R. A. (n. s.) 11C2.
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under the rule of the North Carolina case. As a preliminary to such a consid-
eration it may be pardonable to review in a rather summary fashion7 the com-
monly suggested principles governing the liability of the occupant of land toward
trespassers, with particular reference to those of "tender age" (assuming that
there is some way of determining what age is a "tender age").
At the very outset we must take warning against two intruding elements. It
must be recognized that there is nothing sacred in the right to use and occupy
land. In cases dealing with immature children sentimentality must not be al-
lowed to take the place properly allotted to sentiment. The right to use land has
no reason to claim immunity higher than that granted to other rights, which yield
to the changing needs of a developing social organism. It too must yield. It
cannot be given fixed and eternal attributes. Nor does it seem proper to picture
every child of a dozen years or less as a winged cherub, incapable of intentional
wrong.8 The contention that any doctrine which does not follow the theory of
alluring nuisance is inhumane is nothing less than an appeal to the emotions
alone,9 clouding the problem involved and perhaps even tilting the scales of
justice.' ° The attempt to state the liability of the landowner in a formula of
mathematical exactness makes a fetich of mere legal terminology, with the result
that many discussions in this field sound like the argument between Tweedledum
and Tweedledee. 1
I The scope of this article does not permit a full collection of citations. Excellent collections of
abundant authorities are readily available. See: Jeremiah Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children
Entering Without Permission, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 349 and 434, and the aupplementing note in 12 id. 206;John C. Townes, Liability Arising from Dangerous Premises 1 Tex. Law Rev. 1; 25 Yale L. J. 84; But.
dick, Lao of Torts, 3d ed. , . Vol. 1 secs. 1027-1054; Cooley, Tors,3d ed., pp. 1269 et seq. The discussion by the late Protessor Bnrdick is especially satisfactory. A full
note collecting thte s is foundin 19 L R. A. (n. .) pp. 1095.1173, inclusive, beginning with
Cahill v. Stone Co. (1908) 153 Cal. 571, 96 Pac. 84, 19 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1095. See also 47 L. R. A. (n. a,)1102, a.
8 Looking back at what seems to have been a fairly normal boyhood, containing perhaps an averageof youthful transgressions, the writer finds little sympathy with the view that even a child of tenderyears is necessarily an unconscious and instinctive transgressor and therefore an allured and "innocently
baited victim." Some of those who have discussed this topic either must be a trifle forgetful or else must
have passed through a most sweet, innocent and sheltered childhood.
9 "This cruel and wicked doctrine, unworthy of a civilized jurisprudence, puts property above humanity,
leaves entirely out of view the tender years and infirmity of understanding of the child, indeed his inability
to be a trespasser in sound legal theory, and visits upon him the consequences of his trespass just asthough he were an adult . . ."' Thompson, Negligence, Vol. 1, sec. 102.. he w the mind impelled by the instinct of the heart, sees at once in such a place, and under these
circumstances he had good reason to expect that one day or other some one, probably a thoughtless boy in
the buoyancy of play, would be led there, and injury would follow . . . Perhaps the best monitor In
such a .ase is the conscience of one who feels, in his dreadful recollection, the crushing sense that lie hadleft such an engine of ill to take the life of an innocent child. . . The common feeling of mankind,
guided by the sacred heart of the great law of love, and the common sense of jurors, must be left in such
a case to pronounce upon the facts." Hydraulic Works Co. v. Orr (1877) 83 Pa. St. 332, 336.
1""These phrases have made such a profound impression on some judges as to obscure the vital point
of inquiry and thus prevent a careful consideration of the question at issue." Jeremiah Smith, 11 Harv.
L. Rev. 349, 352.
"As a practical result, the landowner is saddled with the responsibility of an insurer of infants, whoare curious and agile enough to trespass upon lands, having improvements which may be dangerous for
them." Burdick, Law of Torts, sec. 566.
In this same connection the writer calls attention to the case of Edginton v. Burlington of Ga. R. Co.
(1902) 116 Iowa 410, 90 N. W. 95, 57 L. R. A. 561, in which it was said that the rule of attractive
nuisance would not be extended to the "hoodlum, disregarding property rights from mere love of mischief,
and taking risks out of mere bravado, or in conscious defiance of moral and legal restraint." Considering
guch a child, the court says it "may pity his folly, but justly say, as the law says, that having intelligently
assumed the risk, he ought not to recover dampes."
Professor Burdick points out that it will be for the ur to determine whether the boy is a "hoodlum"
or an innocently baited victim," and will determine wether the premises were dangerous, and whether
they were alluring, and whether the defendant used proper care in guarding them. In section 568 he pointsout that the juries are more than likely to find in favor of the injured child since the cases which havebeen carried to the appellate courts are with practical uniformity those in which it is the landowner and not
the child who is seeking to avoid the decision of the jury.
1 Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, Ch. IV: "I know what you're thinking about," said
Tweedledum, "but it isn't so, nohow." "Contrariwise," continued Tweedledee, "if it was so It might be;
and if it were so it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. Thats logic."
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Some of the difficulty may be traced to the conservatism of the courts and
perhaps to an unwarranted and overdrawn fear of judicial legislation.' 2 What-
ever may be true in other fields, in the field of tort there is an ever-present need
that the courts shall always be alert to keep declared duties attuned to the needs
of society by abrogating or modifying old ones, and with reasonable caution, de-
claring new ones. Inflexibility in the law of torts is a sign of impending disso-
lution and death. No legislative body has yet existed which could adjust a rule
of torts with* sufficient nicety to assure smoothness of function in the kaleidoscopic
relations of society, and none has possessed sufficient skill and promptness to
make the minor adjustments which are continually necessary. Judicial caution
is here a high virtue; judicial diffidence is not.13  The common law is not a closed
book to which new. chapters may not be added by the original authors, the courts,
and to which appendixes may be attached only by legislative bodies. A better
simile is that of the modern loose-leaf encyclopxdia, in which new pages may be
added or substituted to meet the development of advancing science.
No recent case has more strongly raised the question of the insufficiency of
heretofore accepted principles as a solution for new problems than has the Britt
case. That this question in this form has continually recurred, that the fixed and
recognized rules governing the duties of the occupant of premises to the stranger
thereon are still under fire, that the "attractive nuisance" doctrine, which traces
back to the Stout case 14 as interpreted, inter alia, by the McDonald case15 has
not in apprbximately fifty years provided an even partially satisfactory solution,
that legislative bodies have not passed remedial statutes; all these furnish ground
for an insistent demand that the duties and liabilities of the occupier of land be
given further consideration.
Briefly stated,"" the chief rules which have received recognition are as follows:
1. The occupier of land must so use it that unreasonable ill effects of his use shall not
reach persons or property beyond its boundaries.
2. Persons making a reasonably careful use of an adjoining highway must not be en-
dangered by changes in his premises, whether injury be occasioned during the use of the
highway or during an accidental deviation therefrom.
3. He must maintain it in a reasonably safe condition for the entry thereon of invitees.
4. "The owner of private grounds is under no obligation to keep them in safe condition
for the benefit of trespassers, idlers, bare licensees, or others who come upon them, not by
2 A typical statement of this kind is found in Dobbins v. M. K. & T. R. Co. (1897) 91 Tex. 60, 41
S. V. 62, 66 A. S. R. 856, where after saying that the declaration of a duty to children is a proper legis-
lative use of the police power, the court adds: "Whenever such a (new) duty is imposed the.courts may
properly enforce it or allow damages for its breach, but not before." See also, 148 N: C. 413, where the
court quotes from the opinion of Judge Buchanan in Walker v. Railroad (1906) 105 Va. 226, 53 S. E.
113, 4 'L. R. A. (n. s.) 80 as follows: "While the courts should and do extend the applications of the com-
mon law to the new conditions of advancing civilization, they may not create new principles or abrogate
any known one. If new conditions can not be met by the application of existing laws, the supplying of
needed laws is the province of the legislature and not the judicial department of the government.,
"'Among others, the opinions of ir. Justice Cardozo of the New York Court of Appeals in a de-
lightful way reveal these stimulating and illuminating characteristics. As a typical instance see Hynes
v. Newo York Cent. R. Co., cited srupra, note 1.
"4 Sioux City & Pac. R. Co. v. Stout (U. S. 1875) 17 Wall. 657, 21 L. Ed. 745.
15 Union Pacific R. Co. v. McDonald (1894) 152 U. S. 262, 14 Sup. Ct. 619, 38 L. Ed. 434. See also,,
Keffe v. Milwaukee R. Co. (1875) 21 Minn. 207, 18 Am. Rep. 393.
"The. authorities cited supra 7, furnish illustrations of these yules, most of which are also set
forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Connor in the Briscoe case, supra, note 6. Citations will not here be
offered upon all specific points. See, however, Ryan v. Towar (1901) 128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 622.
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any invitation express or implied, but for their own convenience or pleasure, or to gratify
thir curiosity, however innocent or laudable their purpose may be.""
1
5. The only duty owing to a trespasser is to refrain from wantonly injuring him after
he is discovered; there is none requiring the landowner to be vigilant in discovering him,
6. A trap may not be set for a trespasser. He is a wrongdoer but not an outlaw beyond
the pale of the law.
7. There is a strong tendency to hold that reasonable anticipation is equivalent to actual
knowledge of the trespasser's presence.
8. Where the landowner has reason to suspect the presence of trespassers, he may not
release (or continue) a dangerous force without previous reasonable search or warning.
9. Where the expected trespasser is an infant, the landowner should be required to use
a correspondingly higher degree of carel
10. The attractive nuisance doctrine offers a well developed exception to the general rule
of non-liability to trespassers, in the statement that, "one who artificially brings or creates on
his own premises any dangerous thing, which from its nature has a tendency to attract the
childish instincts of children to play with it, is bound as a mere matter of social duty, to take
such reasonable precautions as the circumstances permit of, to the end that they be protected
from injury while so playing with it or coming in its vicinity.""
Perhaps too much energy has already been expended in attacking and defend-
ing the last named doctrine, but a few suggestions regarding it are here deemed
necessary. At the very outset it must be observed that the doctrine of alluring
nuisance is founded upon fictions and not upon facts, upon assumptions and not
upon demonstrated relationships. 21 This alone should cause its rejection if it is
possible to frame a rule in accord with the actual facts. While fictions did, during
the period of strict procedural formalism, aid in the development of our law, it is
to be observed that we have paid and are paying a very high price for the tempo-
rary relief which they afforded. Few influences have contributed more to the
permanent distortion of legal theories and principles.
Secondly, the principle as announced is so broad and so sweeping that it can
not be carried to its logical extreme in application without reaching the point of
" Quoted from Union Stock Yards d- Transit Co. v. Rourke (1881) 10 Il1. App. 471. Quoted also in
the Brscoc case, 148 N. C., at p. 403. Compare, Kelly v. Benas (1909) 217 Alo. 1, 9, 116 S. V. 557.
1, "To adults entering without permission the landowner owes some legal duties, He is under a guty
not to intentionally inflict harm upon a trespasser, save when he is exercising within legal limits the rights
of defense and expulsion. He is also, by the better view, under a duty to avoid harming the trespasser
by bringing a force to bear upon him. It is a mooted question whether this duty is confined to cases
where the presence of the trespasser is known to the landowner. Some authorities hold that the owner
may, in special circumstances, be under a duty to use care to ascertain whether trespassers are present
before setting in motion a force, which would be likely to endanger such persons if within reach. Butthe alleged duty if admitted, is material only when it is sought to make the landowner liable for actively
bringing force to bear upon the trespasser." Jeremiah Smith, 11 Harv. L. Rev. 349.
And at page 365 in the same article see the suggestion: "There are some decisions which go to the
extent of holding that the landowner, under special circumstances, owes a duty to ascertain whether
trespassers are present. But the existence of this alleged duty and the failure to perform it are material
only when it is sought to hold the landowner liable for setting (or keeping) force in motion when the tres-passer is actually present on his land. . . If I have reason to believe that adult tramps sleep in my
meadow, and I start my mowing machine without looking aheid to see if. any one is in the path of the
proposed swath, some courts might hold me liable for running over a tramp if I could have avoided him
by a better lookout. . . ° 'There is a broad difference,' said Mr. Justice Carpenter (in Mitchell v. Boston
4- Maine R. R. (1894) 68 N. H. 96, 34 Atl. 674, 677) 'between the case of a trespasser's meeting aii in.
jury by reason of the dangerous condition of the defendant's premises, and that of an injury cauised by
the defendant's active intervention.' " Professor Smith calls attention to the fact that this sort of injury
rarely occurs to the child trespasser, who is most often injured by a force set in motion by himself or
his companions.
"There is no apparent reason why this rule should not be generalized to include those suffering from
any infirmities such as illness, age, lameness, and, in times past, intoxication.
2 Thompson, Ncgligence, Vol. I. sec. 1024; Blevan, Negligence. 2d ed., Vol. I, p. 189. n. 1. "An
allurement seems to be some attraction added to the land, not the mere effect of the land in its natural
state." See also the statement in 11 Harv. L. Rev. at p. 355, calling attention to the fact that the "play-
thing" is generally something of practical necessity to the landowner in the beneficial use of his land, and
perhaps necessary to the community as well.
- This statement is amply sustained by the authorities cited in note 7, supra.
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absurdity,2 2 and, as yet, nobody has been skillful enough to suggest how the rule
may be stated as above set forth and at the same time indicate the point at which
a limit may consistently be established. It has been suggested2 3 that "the owner
of property could not carry on his business in the necessary and ordinary manner
and at the same time take precautions against trespassing children," but this only
shifts the debate into another equally difficult field. Moreover, since it does no
more than present in another form the question lying at the base of the entire dis-
cussion, namely: "whether the danger of occasional harm, under such circum-
stances, outweighs the benefit to the community of leaving owners unfettered in
the beneficial use of their land in methods which cause no damage to persons out-
side their boundaries," it settles nothing.
2 4
And, thirdly, as a corollary to the foregoing, no satisfactory settlement can
ever be reached if we do not take into consideration all the parties involved;
namely, the occupant of the land, whose use is to be restricted, the trespasser,
whom we seek to protect, and the community, whose paramount interest must
always outweigh the interests of individuals. 25 It may be charged, and not with-
out truth, that the formal rules regarding the possession of property were framed
largely from the point of view of the occupant of land, rather than for the pro-
tection of others. It seems to be equally true that the doctrine of alluring nuisance,
because of the strong pull of sympathy, approaches the matter almost entirely
from the position of the child trespasser and considers little besides his interests.
Neither approach seems satisfactory. We must not lose sight of the fact that we
are not seeking merely to protect immature infants, or to punish the landowner for
some transgression. The sole question to be answered is whether the loss which
has happened shall be allowed to lie where it has fallen, or whether it shall, so far
as the award of pecuniary damages can produce that effect, be shifted to the
culpable shoulders of another.
In his work on Negligence,26 we find Mr. Thompson sadly lamenting the
tendency to restrict the doctrine which grew out of the turntable cases. For the
tendency is clear, and the attitude of those courts which have announced the rule
is increasingly expressive of the desire to apply it, if at all, with great caution.
The present writer finds no reason for regret 27 in the fact that in its most recent
decisions,2 s the court in which the doctrine originated, has seen fit to limit sharply
=For examples see: San Antonio & A. P. Ry. v. Morgan (1898) 92 Tex. 98, 46 S. W. 28; Ryan v.
Towar, supra, note 16- and Walker v. Potomac Ry. (1906) 105 Va. 226, 53 S. E. 113, 4 L. R. A. (n. s.)
80, and Turess v. Railroad (1898) 61 N. J. L. 314, 40 AtL. 614. It is obvious that it is wholly impossible
to make premises boy-proof and yet leave them in usable condition. In the Towar case, children made a
hole in a stone wall to get at the water-wheel upon which the injury occurred. Ini Davis v. Malvern Light
Co. (1919) 186 Iowa 884, 173 N. W. 262, a barbed wire fence did not serve to keep a boy away from a
charged electric wire. Compare: Price v. Atchison Water Co. (1897) 58 Kans. 551, 50 Pac. 450; Consol.
Elcc. Co. v. Healy (1902) 65 Kans. 798, 70 Pac. 884.
= Chicago, etc. Ry. v. Fox (1904) 38 Ind. App. 268, 70 N. E. 81.
2 11 Harv. L. Rev. at p. 369 and 12 Harv. L. Rev. 206.
25 "A balance must be struck between the benefit to the community of the unfettered freedom of owners
to make a beneficial use of their land, and the harm which may be done in particular instances by the
use of that freedom. The true ground for the decision is public policy; i.e., expediency in the Benthamic
sense of 'the greatest good to the greatest number;' the advantages to the community on the one side and
the other are the only matters really entitled to be weighed."
23 Supra, note 9. See also Cooley, Torts 3rd ed., p. 1272, and note.
21 The writer takes considerable comfort in the fact that this was also the view of as careful and dis-
passionate a writer as the late Professor Burdick. See Burdick, Law of Torts, sec. 569, p. 532.
23 Supra, note 2.
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this doctrine of attractive nuisance, since he feels that any fair investigation of the
reasoning behind this rule reveals it to be founded on fictions, dangerous if car-
ried to its extreme applications, 29 and unjust if limited within bounds of safety.30
It is not, however, enough to point out reasons for rejecting the attractive
nuisance doctrine. The matter is not thus settled. We have thereby merely re-
turned to our point of original departure, after an unfruitful quest. If we do
reject the doctrine, it must be with the admission that after all it was aimed at
something needing attention and calling for a practical solution.31 But we need
not return to the time when the primitive announcement was made, that "he that
is damaged ought to be recompensed." 32
In the case of Briscoe v. Henderson Lighting & Power Co.,8 3 the Supreme
Court of North Carolina was asked to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine to
the case of a boy who came upon the premises of the defendant to see what was
going on in the rear portion of a theatre building which immediately adjoined the
defendant's premises, and while there fell into a hot water well, which had been
only slightly covered. After a thoughtful review of the subject the court de-
dined to apply the broad and loose doctrine of alluring nuisance, and announced
instead a highly commendable rule, which takes into consideration the infirmities
of youth, the needs of the community, and the necessities of the occupant of the
land. It does not forget humane emotions, neither does it permit unreasoning
sympathy to run away with judgment or to distort settled legal principles. At
page 411 of the official report, the court says:
"It must be conceded that the liability for injuries to children sustained by reason of
dangerous conditions on one's premises is recognized and enforced in cases in which no such
liability accrues to adults. This we think sound in principle and humane in policy. We
have no disposition to deny it or to place unreasonable restrictions upon it. We think that
the law is sustained upon the theory that the infant who enters upon premises having no legal
right to do so, either by permission, invitation or license or relation to the premises or its
owner, is as essentially a trespasser as an adult; but if, to gratify a childish curiosity, or in
obedience to a childish propensity excited by the character of the structure or other con-
ditions, he goes thereon and is injured by the failure of the owner to properly guard or cover
the dangerous conditions which he has created, he is liable for such injuries, provided the facts
are such as to impose the duty of anticipation or prevision;" that is, whethcr under all of the
circumstances he should have contemplated that children would be attracted or allured to go
upon his premises and sustain injury."
And again at page 415:
"To impose upon the owners the burden of prevision, in the absence of any suggestion
that by acquiescence or otherwise they had given a license to trespassers, would imperil the
property of innocent persons."
See Turess v. Railroad, quoted in 148 N. C., at p. 407.
P One need look no further than the Briscoe case, upon which this discussion turns, for Justification
of these conclusions.
.At Opelt v. At. G. Barnes Co. (Cal. App.) (1919) 183 Pac. 241. "The attractive nuisance doctrine,
for all its fiction obscurities, is driving at a truth; and that the measure of assumption of risk which oper-
ates in law to defeat a recovery should not be the same for small boys and men-even on circus day."
OLambert v. Bessey, 31 Car. II, T. Raym. 421, 423, 424.
83 Supra, note 6.
41 Italics are the writer's. In the unofficial reports this word has been erroneously printed as "pro-
vision," which greatly modifies the meaning intended to be expressed.
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In other words, whenever the owner of premises has reason to know that the
trespasser is upon his premises and liable to be injured by some thing dangerous
to that trespasser, he is under legal duty to render and keep the premises cor-
respondingly safe.
It is suggested that this was in fact the basis of the first turntable case, for
in the Stout case 5 the court goes expressly upon the theory of liability for fore-
seeable hurt. It is said that the court in that case charged the jury in part as
follows:
"But if the defendant did know, or had reason to believe, that the children of the place
would resort to the turntable to play, and, if they did, they would or might be injured, then,
if they took no means to keep the children away and no means to prevent accidents, they
would be guilty of negligence and would be answerable for damages caused to children by
such negligence. . . That if they did not have reason to anticipate that children would be
likely to resort to it, or that they would be likely to be injured if they did resort to it, then
there was no negligence."
No emphasis at all seems to have been placed upon the matter of enticement, and
it remained for succeeding cases36 to translate this language into the doctrine of
attractive nuisance, and to create a battle ground that within the last forty years
has been occupied by contending forces.
It is interesting to note that the doctrine has had a hearing in the English
courts. In the case of Cooke v. Midland & G. W. Ry of Ireland,37 a child of
four or five years was injuired upon an abandoned turntable, situated near a high-
way, and reached by a well-worn path through a gap in the surrounding hedge.
The turntable was not locked and had not been used by the defendant for some
years. Railway employees, including the district inspector, had seen young folks
nf all ages disporting themselves upon it, but it did not appear that anybody had
ever ordered them off. The machine was serving no useful purpose, and, to use
the words of Lord MacNaghten, "it seems to have been abandoned to the susten-
ance of the railway inspector's goat, and the diversion of the youth of Navan."
While some members of the court referred to the doctrine of attractiveness, it is
obvious that this case, like the Stout case and the Briscoe case, goes upon the
theory of foreseeable hurt to those known or reasonably expected to be upon the
premises. Lord Loreburn says that the place "was, to the defendant's knowledge,
an habitual resort for children," and Lord MacNaghten says: "Persons may not
think it worth while to take ordinary care of their own property, and may not be
compellable to do so; but it does not seem unreasonable to hold that, if they allow
their property to be open to all comers, infants as well as children of maturer age,
and place upon it a machine attractive to children and dangerous as a plaything,
they may be responsible to those who resort to it with their tacit permission, and
who are unable in consequence of their tender age to take care of themselves."
Attractiveness argues only for the conclusion that there was knowledge of likeli-
5 Supra, note 14.
M Union Pacific v. McDonald, and Keffe v. Milwaukee Ry., cited supra, note 15.
E2 (1909) A. C. 229, cited in the Britt case. Chenery v. Fitchburg R. R. Co. (1893) 160 Mass. 211, 35
N. E. 554. 22 L. R. A. 575.
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hood of presence and of probable injury, and seems to leave culpability hanging
upon this question of knowledge. The North Carolina rule seems therefore to be
a very satisfactory return to basic principles.
At first glance this rule might seem to render inoperative the ever-present
element of allurement. But it is far from doing that, since the attractive nature
of the premises or things thereon may be evidence that the occupier knew or
should have known that trespassers were, because of those things, bound to ap-
pear on the land. Would any sane man who placed upon a vacant lot an organ
grinder and his monkey have any doubts that, even in a small village, it would not
be many minutes before there would be a number of children upon the lot? Tested
by experience, a myriad of other things may be found which will attract children
of all ages from nine to ninety, and when the owner or occupant of land has this
notice of their probable presence it is not an excessive hardship to ask him to take
reasonable steps to correct dangers or warn others of them.
Under the rule announced in the Briscoe case it seems probable that the
North Carolina court would reach the same result as was reached by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Britt case.38 For it appears that the owner
there had no reason to know of the presence of trespassers who might bathe in
this pool, unless we hold that the paths which crossed the lot and the fact of
nearness to a city of 10,000 people carried this notice. The facts of the Briscoe
case are sufficiently close to those of the Britt case to warrant the belief that in
both cases alike the decision would be against the trespasser.
But upon the facts in the Britt case it is hard to be satisfied with this result,
which was proper enough in the Briscoe case. There must be a feeling that the
owner was not exactly blameless when he left a highly dangerous condition of
this sort upon his land, and this is intensified by the fact that the condition was a
perfectly useless one, wholly unconnected with any beneficial use of the premises.
It is somewhat misleading to speak, as does Mr. Justice Clark in the Britt case,
of "maintaining" this condition, since the word carries the idea of activity in cqn-
tinuance of the condition, whereas the danger was entirely a passive one. No one
would for a moment deny that the danger was so great that a moral duty of the
very highest kind rested upon the defendant company in respect of this pool of
poisonous water. The real question is whether this moral duty shall find ex-
pression as a legal duty. The rather normal first reaction is to declare that where
the injury is of such an outrageous nature something must be done to make the
landowner responsible for injuries arising out of it. The turntable cases caused
just such a reaction, and the doctrine of alluring nuisance stands as a warning
against further hasty action in this connection.
Arising out of the considerations herein mentioned there is a suggestion
which may be worth considering. We have seen that there is a tendency to hold
the landowner liable for forces which he may release against suspected trespassers,
without first making reasonable investigation to discover their presence, or first
-" Supra, note 2.
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giving reasonable warning to those whose presence may be anticipated. This goes
beyond the letter of the rule of the Briscoe case, but seems wholly within the gen-
eral spirit of that decision, despite the fact that here we would be requiring a certain
prevision. What is at the basis of such a requirement? Is it not the notion that,
while the trespasser must take premises as he finds them, and while, in general,
he must look out for himself, we will not ask him to assume the risk of those
things against which he can not possibly guard, and which without great incon-
venience could be cared for by the landowner. This is the same underlying notion
which, properly, led the court in the Briscoe case to hold that there would be
liability in the case of infant trespassers where there would be none in the case of
an adult. We therefore find developed along with the idea of culpability of the
landowner arising out of his knowledge, the idea that his duty to render his
premises safe must also be commensurate with the infirmities, or weakness, or
inability to accomplish self-protection, of the trespasser. The trespasser is a
wrongdoer, but he is not an outlaw to be wantonly destroyed. We are approach-
ing desperately near wanton destruction, where there is left in the path of a
possible trespasser an extremely deadly agency, wholly beyond his ability to
recognize and thus avoid. In the much cited case of Lynch v. Nurdin3 9 the court
says, "Between wilful mischief and gross negligence, the boundary line is hard to
trace; I should say impossible." While it requires an actual intention to make a
trap out of a passively dangerous condition upon the defendant's land, may not
the extremely treacherous and insidious nature of the danger, as in the Britt case,
bring the matter desperately near the line, if not actually beyond it?
The reason for not permitting the landowner to release upon his land a force
which he should know may injure possible trespassers is not based upon any de-
sire to punish the landowner for wanton injury, and it is therefore not necessary
to invoke any half-fiction of intent. We are simply saying that there are certain
dangers which the trespasser does not assume, which he, by any exercise of his
faculties, can not detect and avoid, and which he will not be required to antici-
pate. 40  Have we not here a basis for a reasonable extension of our rule? Is
there, from the common-sense point of view, any but a technical difference be-
tween injury by a gun discharged without warning, and injury by any other
means which no exercise of the faculties could detect, which no man in the light
of his every-day experience could discover? Is this not the type of case in which
a certain amount of prevision should be required? In other words, if the danger
is a highly poisonous pool of water, near a considerable city, should we shut our
eyes to matters of common knowledge, and refuse to recognize that sooner or later
trespassers are bound to appear on these premises, and that they will be likely to
come into contact with this extreme danger, against which their highest vigilance
will be no protection?
P (1841) 1 Q. B. 29.
40 The case of Uniois Stockyards and Transit Co. v. Rourke (1881) 10 II. App. 474, cited at page
403 in the Briscoe case offers an excellent illustration of the limitation of this suggested rule, for there
the trespasser could have discovered his peril by probing the ground with a stick, and was near a water-
course where bogs and quagmires were to be anticipated. We might require a trespasser to carry a stick,
but we could not demand that he equip himself with a complete chemical laboratory and be accompanied
by an expert chemist.
